We employ a set of sign restrictions on the impulse responses of a Global VAR model, estimated for 38 countries/regions over the period 1979Q2-2011Q2, as well as bounds on impact price elasticities of oil supply and oil demand to discriminate between supply-driven and demand-driven oil-price shocks, and to study the time pro…le of their macroeconomic e¤ects across a wide range of countries and real/…nancial variables. We show that the above identi…cation scheme can greatly bene…t from the cross-sectional dimension of the GVAR-by providing a large number of additional cross-country sign restrictions and hence reducing the set of admissible models. The results indicate that the economic consequences of a supply-driven oil-price shock are very di¤erent from those of an oil-demand shock driven by global economic activity, and vary for oilimporting countries compared to energy exporters. While oil importers typically face a long-lived fall in economic activity in response to a supply-driven surge in oil prices, the impact is positive for energy-exporting countries that possess large proven oil/gas reserves. However, in response to an oil-demand disturbance, almost all countries in our sample experience long-run in ‡ationary pressures, an increase in real output, a rise in interest rates, and a fall in equity prices.
Introduction
How do oil-price shocks a¤ect real output, in ‡ation, the real e¤ective exchange rates, interest rates, and equity prices in di¤erent countries, including major oil exporters? Drawing on insights from Baumeister and Peersman (2012) and Kilian and Murphy (2012) , we identify two groups of explanatory factors as the main drivers of the evolution of crude oil prices: (i) fast-growing demand due to high global economic growth; and (ii) declining supply or expected production shortfalls in the future. We employ a set of dynamic sign restrictions on the impulse responses of a Global VAR (GVAR) model as well as bounds on impact price elasticities of oil supply and oil demand to identify the underlying demand and supply shocks in the world crude oil market, and to study the macroeconomic consequences of oil-price ‡uctuations across di¤erent countries (including both commodity importers and exporters). We show that these sign/quantity restrictions can greatly bene…t from the crosssectional dimension of the GVAR-which provides a large number of additional cross-country identifying restrictions and reduces the set of admissible structural impulse responses.
Our GVAR approach employs a dynamic multi-country framework for the analysis of the international transmission of shocks, and comprises 38 country/region-speci…c models, among which is a single Euro Area region (including 8 of the 11 countries that joined Euro in 1999) as well as the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). These individual models are solved in a global setting where core macroeconomic variables of each economy are related to corresponding foreign variables, which have been constructed to match the international trade pattern of the country under consideration and serve as a proxy for common unobserved factors. The model has both real and …nancial variables: real GDP, in ‡ation, real equity prices, real e¤ective exchange rate, short and long-term interest rates, global oil production, and the price of oil. We treat the latter endogenously as the question of whether oil prices are demand-driven or supply-driven often reignites debate about their exogenous or endogenous treatment in macroeconomic models. Our framework is able to account for various transmission channels, including not only trade relationships but also …nancial linkages through interest rates, equity prices, and exchange rates; see and Pesaran et al. (2007) . We estimate the 38 individual VARX* models over the period 1979Q2-2011Q2. Having solved the GVAR model, we examine the e¤ect of oildemand and oil-supply shocks on the macroeconomic variables of di¤erent countries.
Consistent with the …ndings of earlier studies 1 -but at a more disaggregated country level and for a wider range of macroeconomic aggregates-the results of our "set-identi…ed" GVAR model of the world economy indicate that the economic consequences of a supply-driven oil-price shock are very di¤erent from those of an oil-demand shock driven by changes in global economic activity; and very di¤erent for oil-importing countries when compared with energy exporters. We …nd that while oil importers typically face a long-lived fall in economic activity in response to a supply-driven surge in oil prices, the impact is positive for energy-exporting countries that possess large proven oil/gas reserves. However, in response to an oil-demand disturbance, almost all countries in our sample experience long-run in ‡ationary pressures, and an increase in real output. Furthermore, following an oil-demand shock interest rates increase while equity prices fall in all major oil-importing countries. Compared to , the current paper advances the work on GVAR modelling in the following directions: (i) we extend the geographical coverage of the GVAR model to major oil exporters as well as other countries in the Middle East and North Africa region; (ii) we extend the sample period until the second quarter of 2011, thus including both the recent oil price boom (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) as well as the initial oil-supply disruptions which accompanied the Arab Spring (see Figure 1 for the evolution of oil prices and a history of oil production disruptions since 1970); (iii) we allow for the simultaneous determination of oil prices, oil production, and several key macroeconomic variables in a global setting; and (iv) we demonstrate how a GVAR model, covering over 90% of world GDP, 85% of world oil consumption, and 80% of world proven oil reserves, can be used for "set-identi…ed" impulse response analysis and to obtain a better understanding of structural shocks.
Furthermore, we contribute to the literature that assesses the macroeconomic e¤ects of oil price shocks along the following dimensions. To study the oil-macroeconomy relationship, we provide a compact model of the world economy that takes into account the economic interlinkages and spillovers that exist between di¤erent regions (which may also shape the responses of di¤erent macroeconomic variables to oil price shocks), rather than undertaking a country-by-country structural VAR analysis of the oil market. By directly controlling for macroeconomic determinants of oil demand in a large-scale macroeconometric model of the world economy, rather than relying on proxies for global real economic activity, we try to achieve a better understanding of structural oil-supply and oil-demand shocks.
Moreover, while there is a growing literature that employs sign restrictions on impulse responses as a way of identifying shocks in structural VARs-for example, Faust (1998) , Uhlig (2005) , and Canova and Nicoló (2002)-we extend this approach to a GVAR framework in which the cross-sectional dimension of the model is utilized to identify shocks that are global in nature, i.e. shocks that a¤ect many countries simultaneously. Fry and Pagan (2011) argue that sign restrictions solve the parametric identi…cation problem present in structural VARs but leave the model identi…cation problem unresolved. The latter refers to the fact that there are many models with identi…ed parameters that provide the same …t to the data. To narrow the set of admissible structural models, we follow Kilian and Murphy (2012) and augment the above sign restrictions with bounds on impact price elasticities of oil demand and oil supply (to rule out those models that imply economically implausible responses). We also show that the global dimension of the GVAR-by o¤ering a large number of additional cross-country sign restrictions-can signi…cantly narrow the number of plausible models that satisfy our a priori sign/quantity restrictions, and therefore can move us one step closer to calculating those impulse responses that are qualitatively and sometimes quantitatively similar. However, we acknowledge that even after imposing sign restrictions, bounds on oilprice elasticities, and cross-country identifying restrictions, there are still a large number of structural models that satisfy these restrictions and therefore it is necessary to …nd a way to summarize the available information. For this purpose, we follow Fry and Pagan (2011) and report the "Medium Target" of our impulse responses (a single model whose impulse responses are as close as possible to the median values).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief review of the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the GVAR methodology while Section 4 outlines our modelling approach. Section 5 explains the identi…cation procedure used in this paper and investigates the macroeconomic e¤ects of oil-supply and oil-demand shocks. Finally, Section 6 concludes and o¤ers some policy recommendations.
Literature Review
We are certainly not the …rst ones to emphasize the importance of identifying the underlying sources of oil-price shocks for studying their macroeconomic consequences. Using a structural VAR framework for the case of the United States, Kilian (2009) decomposes oil-price shocks into three types-an oil-supply shock, an oil-demand shock driven by economic activity, and an oil-speci…c demand shock driven by expectations about future changes in oil conditionsand concludes that the macroeconomic e¤ect of the most recent oil price surge was generally moderate. This observation could be interpreted as evidence of the key role played by the demand side in explaining the recent boom in oil prices. Had the shock been triggered by supply-side factors, global aggregate demand would have fallen, because a negative supply shock is perceived to be a tax on oil consumers (with a high propensity to consume) in favor of oil producers (with a lower propensity to consume). Following a supply-driven oil price shock and in the presence of nonlinearities in the product and labor markets (for example price and wage rigidities), production costs increase and as a result in ‡ation rises; often prompting central banks to raise their policy rates, and placing additional downward pressure on growth.
2 However, in response to a demand-driven oil price shock, combined with a near vertical oil supply curve, output and in ‡ation move in the same direction (both increase). Hamilton (2009) argues that while historical oil price shocks were primarily associated with physical supply disruptions, the price run-up of 2007-08 was caused by strong global demand and stagnating world oil production. He then concludes that in spite of di¤erent causes, the consequences for the economy of higher oil prices have been very similar to those observed in earlier episodes. Most papers in the literature that investigate the e¤ects of oil shocks on macroeconomic variables have focused on a handful of industrialized/OECD countries, and in most cases they have looked at the impact of oil shocks exclusively on the United States (and in isolation from the rest of the world). Moreover, the focus of those analyses has predominantly been on net oil importers-see, for example, Blanchard and Gali (2007) , Hamilton (2009 ), Kilian (2009 ), and Peersman and Van Robays (2012 . An exception is the work of Esfahani et al. (2012a) , which looks at the direct e¤ects of oil-revenue shocks on domestic output for 9 major oil exporters, six of which are OPEC members. But they do not investigate the di¤erential e¤ects of demand-versus supply-driven oil-price shocks, and conduct a country-by-country VARX* analysis. Another exception is Chapter 4 of International Monetary Fund (2012) World Economic Outlook (WEO), which provides a discussion of the e¤ects of commodity 2 See Raissi (2011) for a discussion of optimal monetary policy in the presence of labor market ine¢ ciencies. price shocks on commodity exporters, using the methodology in Kilian (2009) .
3 Finally, Kilian et al. (2009) examine the e¤ects of di¤erent types of oil-price shocks on the external balances of net oil exporters/importers. Therefore, our paper is complementary to the analysis of the e¤ects of oil-price shocks on advanced economies, given its wide country coverage, including both major oil exporters (located in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America) as well as many developing countries and the fact that our modelling strategy accounts for economic interlinkages that exist among di¤erent countries.
The Global VAR (GVAR) Methodology
We consider N + 1 countries in the global economy, indexed by i = 0; 1; :::; N . With the exception of the United States, which we label as 0 and take to be the reference country, all other N countries are modelled as small open economies. This set of individual VARX* models is used to build the GVAR framework. Following Pesaran (2004) and , a VARX* (s i ; s i ) model for the ith country relates a k i 1 vector of domestic macroeconomic variables (treated as endogenous), x it , to a k i 1 vector of country-speci…c foreign variables (taken to be weakly exogenous), x it , and to a m d 1 vector of observed global factors, d t , which could include such variables as commodity prices:
for t = 1; 2; :::; T , where a i0 and a i1 are k i 1 vectors of …xed intercepts and coe¢ cients on the deterministic time trends, respectively, and u it is a k i 1 vector of country-speci…c shocks, which we assume are serially uncorrelated with zero mean and a non-singular covariance matrix, ii , namely u it s i:i:d:
i L i are the matrix lag polynomial of the coe¢ cients associated with the domestic, foreign, and global variables, respectively. As the lag orders for these variables, s i and s i ; are selected on a country-by-country basis, we are explicitly allowing for i (L; s i ), i (L; s i ), and i (L; s i ) to di¤er across countries. The country-speci…c foreign variables are constructed as cross-sectional averages of the domestic variables using data on bilateral trade as the weights, w ij :
where j = 0; 1; :::N; w ii = 0; and P N j=0 w ij = 1. For empirical application, the trade weights are computed as …xed weights based on the average trade ‡ows measured over the period 2006 to 2008. However, the weights can be based on any time period and can be allowed to be time-varying. 4 Although estimation is done on a country-by-country basis, the GVAR model is solved for the world as a whole, taking account of the fact that all variables are endogenous to the system as a whole. After estimating each country VARX*(s i ; s i ) model separately, all the
to be solved simultaneously using the link matrix de…ned in terms of the country-speci…c weights. To see this, we can write the VARX* model in equation (1) more compactly as:
for i = 0; 1; :::; N; where
Note that given equation (2) we can write:
where W i = (W i0 ; W i1 ; :::; W iN ), with W ii = 0, is the (k i + k i ) k weight matrix for country i de…ned by the country-speci…c weights, w ij . Using (5) we can write equation (3) as:
where (6), we obtain the Global VAR(s) model in domestic variables only:
where
For an illustration of the solution of the GVAR model, using a VARX*(1; 1) model, see Pesaran (2004) , and for a detailed exposition of the GVAR methodology see . The GVAR(s) model in equation (7) can be solved recursively and used for a number of purposes, such as forecasting or impulse response analysis.
A Global VAR Model Including Major Oil Exporters
The GVAR literature almost exclusively focuses on business cycle linkages among advanced and major emerging market economies, with limited attention to growth spillovers to/from major oil exporters (e.g. the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members). While the international business cycle is very important for the economic performance of commodity exporters, macroeconomic and political developments in this group of countries also have large consequences for the rest of the world through their impact on global oil prices. In contrast to the literature, we use a GVAR model including major oil exporters to disentangle the size and speed of the transmission of di¤erent oil-price shocks to the global economy. Speci…cally, we extend the country coverage of the GVAR dataset used in by adding 11 major oil exporters located in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, as well as another six oil-importing countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, see Table 1 . 5 Thus our version of the GVAR model covers 50 countries as opposed to the "standard" 33 country set-up used in the literature, see Smith and Galesi (2010) , and extends the coverage both in terms of major oil exporters and also by including an important region of the world when it comes to oil supply, the MENA region.
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Of the 50 countries included in our sample, 17 are oil exporters, of which 10 are current members of the OPEC and one is a former member (Indonesia left OPEC in January 2009). We were not able to include Angola and Iraq, the remaining two OPEC members, due to the lack of su¢ ciently long time series data. This was also the case for Russia, the secondlargest oil exporter in the world, for which quarterly data is not available for the majority of our sample period. Our sample also includes three OECD oil exporters and the UK, which remained a net oil exporter for the majority of the sample (until 2006) , and therefore is treated as an oil exporter when it comes to imposing sign-restrictions (see the discussion in Section 5). These 50 countries together cover over 90% of world GDP, 85% of world oil consumption, and 80% of world proven oil reserves. Thus our sample is rather comprehensive. For empirical applications, we create two regions; one of which comprises the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE); and the other is the Euro Area block comprising 8 of the 11 countries that initially joined the euro on January 1, 1999: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain. The time series data for the GCC block and the Euro Area block are constructed as cross-sectionally weighted averages of the domestic variables (described in detail below), using Purchasing Power Parity GDP weights, averaged over the 2006-2008 period. Thus, as displayed in Table 1 , the GVAR model that we specify includes 38 country/region-speci…c VARX* models.
Variables
The macroeconomic variables included in the individual VARX* models depend on both the modelling strategy employed as well as whether data on a particular variable is available. Each country-speci…c model has a maximum of six domestic (endogenous) variables and …ve foreign (exogenous) variables. We also include two global variables, each of which is treated endogenously in only one country, while being weakly exogenous in the remaining 37 country models. Below we describe the di¤erent variables included in our model and provide justi…cation for our modelling speci…cation. For various data sources used to build the quarterly GVAR dataset, covering 1979Q2 to 2011Q2, see Appendix A.
Domestic Variables
Real GDP, y it , the rate of in ‡ation, it , short-term interest rate, r S it , long-term interest rate, r L it , and real equity prices, eq it are the …ve domestic variables that are included in our model, as well as most of the GVAR applications in the literature. These …ve variables are constructed as:
where GDP it is the real Gross Domestic Product at time t for country i, CP I it is the consumer price index, EQ it is a nominal Equity Price Index, and
The GVAR literature also includes a sixth domestic variable, representing the real exchange rate and de…ned as e it p it , that is the log of the nominal exchange rate of country i, ln (E it ) ; de ‡ated by the domestic CPI. However, in a multi-country set-up, it might be better to consider a measure of the real e¤ective exchange rate, rather than e it p it . We therefore follow and construct such a variable, reer it .
To construct the real e¤ective exchange rate for country i, we simply take the nominal e¤ective exchange rate, neer it , add the log of foreign price level (p it ) and subtract the domestic (p it ) price level. Note that neer it is a weighted average of the bilateral exchange rates between country i and all of its trading partners j, where j = 0; :::; N: In the current application we have a total of 36 countries and two regions in our model, N = 37, therefore we can use the nominal exchange rates denominated in U.S. dollars for each country, e it , to calculate reer it . More speci…cally:
where the foreign price is calculated as the weighted sum of log price level indices (p jt ) of
w ij p jt , and w ij is the trade share of country j for country i. Given that
w ij e jt , the real e¤ective exchange rate can be written as:
This constructed measure of the real e¤ective exchange rate is then included in our model as the sixth domestic variable.
Foreign Variables
We include …ve foreign variables in our model. In particular, all domestic variables, except for that of the real e¤ective exchange rate, have corresponding foreign variables. The exclusion of reer it is simply because reer it already includes both domestic, e it p it , and foreign, e it p it , nominal exchanges rates de ‡ated by the appropriate price levels, see equation (11). Therefore, reer it does not by itself have any economic meaning. The foreign variables are all computed as in equation (2), or more speci…cally:
The trade weights, w ij , are computed as a three-year average to reduce the impact of individual yearly movements on the weights:
where T ijt is the bilateral trade of country i with country j during a given year t and is calculated as the average of exports and imports of country i with j, and T it = P N j=0 T ijt (the total trade of country i) for t = 2006; 2007; 2008; in the case of all countries. The trade shares used to construct the foreign variables are given in the 38 38 matrix provided in Table 7 of Appendix A.
Global Variables
Given that we want to consider the macroeconomic e¤ects of oil shocks on the global economy, we also need to include nominal oil prices (in U.S. dollars), P oil t , as well as the quantity of oil produced in the world, Q oil t . A key question is how should these two variables be included in the GVAR model? Since we will estimate the model over the second quarter of 1979 to the second quarter of 2011, we look at oil consumption over this period for the four largest oil importers in the world, as well as for di¤erent country groupings. Table 2 shows that the United States consumed on average about 27% of world oil between 1979-2010. Comparing this to the other three major oil importers (China, Euro Area, and Japan), we note that U.S. consumption is far larger than any of these countries or even the other regions in the world considered in this paper. In fact the sum of consumption of the other major oil importers is 26:6%, which is still below that of the United States. Therefore, as is now standard in the literature, we include log oil prices, p oil t , as a "global variable" determined in the U.S. VARX* model; that is the price of oil is included in the U.S. model as an endogenous variable while it is treated as weakly exogenous in the model for all other countries.
Turning to the largest oil exporters in the world, we notice from Table 3 that Saudi Arabia, and more speci…cally the GCC countries, play an important role when it comes to world oil supply. Not only do these six countries produce more than 22% of world oil and export around 30% of the world total, which is almost three times that of the OECD oil exporters, the six GCC countries also possess 36.3% of the world's proven oil reserves. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is not only the largest oil producer and exporter in the world, but 7 A similar approach has also typically been followed in Global VAR models estimated in the literature. See, for example, . 8 Note that proven reserves at any given point in time are de…ned as "quantities of oil that geological and engineering information indicate with reasonable certainty can be recovered in the future from known reservoirs under existing economic and operating conditions" (British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy), thus this measure could be uncertain. it also has the largest spare capacity and as such is often seen as a global swing producer. For example, in September of 1985, Saudi production was increased from 2 million barrels per day (mbd) to 4.7 mbd (causing oil prices to drop from $57.61 to $29.62 in real terms, see Figure 1 ), and more recently Saudi Arabia has increased its production to stabilize the oil market. Therefore, given the status of the GCC countries with regard to oil supply, we include log of oil production, q oil t , as an endogenous variable in the GCC block, and as a weakly exogenous variable in all other countries. Accordingly, q oil t is the second "global variable" in our model. Making one region out of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, is not without economic reasoning. The rationale is that these countries have in recent decades implemented a number of policies and initiatives to foster economic and …nancial integration in the region with a view to establishing a monetary union (loosely based on that of the Euro Area). Abstracting from their level of success with above objectives, the states of the GCC are relatively similar in structure, though in the short term they may face some di¢ culties in meeting the convergence criteria they have set for economic integration based on those of the European Union (EU). In ‡ation rates vary signi…cantly across these countries and …scal de…cits, which have improved since the start of the oil boom in 2003, are about to re-emerge in some countries. However, these economies already peg their currencies to the U.S. dollar, except for Kuwait, which uses a dollar-dominated basket of currencies, and are accustomed to outsourcing their interest-rate policy. They also have relatively open capital accounts, and hence, it is reasonable to group these countries as one region. 
Model Speci…cation
Given the discussion in Section 4.1, we specify three di¤erent sets of individual countryspeci…c models. The …rst speci…cation is common across all countries apart from the United States and the GCC block. These 36 VARX* models include six endogenous/domestic variables, when available, …ve country-speci…c foreign variables, and two global variables, see Table 4 . Using the same terminology as in equation (1), the 6 1 vector of endogenous and the 5 1 vector of exogenous variables are given by x it = y it ; it ; eq it ; r Notes: For the de…nition of the variables see equations (9) and (11).
The second speci…cation relates to the GCC block only, for which the log of oil production, q oil t , is included in the model endogenously in addition to the three domestic variables in x it , 9 See Mohaddes and Williams (2012) for more details. while x it and the log of nominal oil prices, p oil t , are included as weakly exogenous variables. Finally, the U.S. model is speci…ed di¤erently from the others, mainly because of the dominance of the United States in the world economy. Firstly, based on the discussion above regarding oil consumption, the price of oil is included in the model endogenously. Secondly, given the importance of U.S. …nancial variables in the global economy, the U.S.-speci…c foreign …nancial variables, eq U S;t and r L U S;t , are not included in this model. The exclusion of these two variables was also con…rmed by our preliminary analysis, in which the weak exogeneity assumption was rejected for eq U S;t and r L U S;t in the U.S. model. Finally, since e it is expressed as domestic currency price of a United States dollar, it is by construction determined outside this model. Thus, instead of the real e¤ective exchange rate, we included e U S;t p U S;t as a weakly exogenous foreign variable in the U.S. model.
For brevity, we present the country-speci…c estimates and tests in Appendix B, including discussions about lag order selection, cointegrating relations, and persistence pro…les. We also provide evidence for the weak exogeneity assumption of the foreign variables and discuss the issue of structural breaks in the context of our GVAR model in Appendix B.
Identi…cation of Oil Shocks
Understanding the factors driving crude oil prices is essential for assessing their economic e¤ects. We compare the macroeconomic consequences of supply-driven versus demand-driven oil-price shocks across a set of developed and developing countries that are structurally very diverse with respect to the role of oil and other forms of energy in their economies. A negative oil supply shock is an exogenous shift of the oil supply curve along the oil demand schedule to the left, lowering oil production, and increasing oil prices. A good example of such a shock would be exogenous oil production disruptions caused by geopolitical tensions in the Middle-East. In contrast, a positive oil demand shock driven by global economic activity (represented by an upward shift of the oil demand curve along the oil supply schedule to the right) is a shock that increases both oil production and prices. The surge in oil demand on the back of strong economic growth in emerging economies would be an example.
Identi…cation Strategy
To discriminate oil-supply disturbances from oil-demand shocks, we rely on three sets of identifying restrictions within our GVAR framework: (a) dynamic sign restrictions; (b) cross-country sign restrictions arising from the global dimension of the GVAR model; (c) and bounds on impact price elasticities of oil supply and oil demand.
Regarding conditions (a) and (b), we require negative oil-supply shocks to be associated with: (i) an increase in oil prices; (ii) a decrease in global oil production levels; and (iii) a decline in the sum of real GDPs across all oil importers in our sample. We impose these sign restrictions, (i) to (iii), to hold for one year after the shocks to allow for sluggish responses of quantity measures (oil production and real GDPs). We do not impose any restrictions on real output for the GCC region or the other 11 countries in our sample that have been net oil exporters over the studied period, as the e¤ect of a negative supply shock on the level of GDP for this group is ambiguous, see Table 5 . To the extent that no other economically meaningful shocks are able to produce a negative correlation between real output and real oil prices across all oil-importing economies, this identi…cation scheme uniquely identi…es a set of oil-supply shocks. For oil-demand shocks on the other hand, we require an increase in: (i) oil prices; (ii) oil production levels; and (iii) the sum of real output across the 36 countries and two regions to hold within the …rst year. 10 We should stress that the global dimension of the GVAR model can provide additional identifying restrictions and can greatly reduce the number of admissible models, see Table 6 . Speci…cally, condition (iii) imposes that the cumulated sum of the relevant individual-country outputs are negative if faced with an oil-supply shock, and positive if an oil-demand shock prevails. 11 Intuitively, a negative oil supply shock is perceived to be a tax on oil consumers (with a high propensity to consume) in favor of oil producers (with a lower propensity to consume) and is associated with a fall in global aggregate demand (hence the cross-country restrictions). However, sign restrictions alone are not su¢ ciently informative in exactly identifying the macroeconomic e¤ects of oil-demand and oil-supply shocks because some admissible models based on sign restrictions may imply economically implausible responses (i.e. a large instantaneous increase in oil production in response to an increase in oil prices; implying a large short-run elasticity of oil supply). Kilian and Murphy (2012) argue that it is important to augment these restrictions with other sets of identifying assumptions (such as quantity restrictions: bounds on impact price elasticities of oil demand and oil supply) to narrow the set of admissible structural models. Drawing on these insights, we impose the following set 10 Mohaddes and Raissi (2011) show that for an oil-importing but labor-exporting small open economy which receives large (and stable) in ‡ows of external income (the sum of FDI, remittances, and grants) from oil-rich countries, the impact of oil shocks on the economy's macroeconomic variables can be very similar to those of the oil exporters from which it receives these large income ‡ows. 11 We also considered a cumulated weighted average of the outputs, using PPP GDP weights, and obtained very similar results. We will thus focus on the results using the simple cumulated sum of the output responses in the remainder of the paper. (9) and (11). For the list of the 12 oil exporting and 26 importing countries/regions, see Table 1 .
of quantity restrictions on the impact impulse responses (c): an upper bound of 0:025 on the short-run price elasticity of oil supply and a range of 0:8 to zero for the impact price elasticity of oil demand. These bounds are justi…ed based on a consensus in the literature that the short-run price elasticity of oil supply is close to zero and that of oil demand is weakly negative (estimated based on historical data). 12 Given these three sets of identifying restrictions, (a) to (c), the implementation procedure is as follows. Let v it denote the structural VARX* model innovations given by:
whereP i is a k i k i matrix of coe¢ cients to be identi…ed. We carry out a Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of the vector of residuals u it for each country model i (= 0; :::; N ) to obtain the lower triangular matrix P i that satis…es v i = P i P 0 i . However, for any orthogonal k i k i matrix Q i , the matrixP i = P i Q i also satis…es v i =P iP 0 i . To examine a wide range of possible solutions forP i and construct a set of admissible models, we repeatedly draw at random from the orthogonal matrices Q i and discard candidate solutions forP i that do not satisfy a set of a priori sign and quantity restrictions on the implied impulse responses functions. These rotations are based on the QR decomposition.
More compactly, we construct the k k matrixP as 0 =Pu t . We draw 5; 000 times and only retain those valid rotations that satisfy our set of a priori restrictions.
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Since there are a few impulse responses that satisfy our postulated identifying restrictions, we summarize them by reporting a central tendency and the 16th and 84th percentiles as measures of the spread of responses. Although the remaining models-after imposing identifying restrictions (a) to (c)-imply qualitatively and sometimes quantitatively similar responses, the central tendency measure (i.e. median) for impulse responses of di¤erent variables (across the 38 countries/regions) may come from di¤erent impulse vectors (supplyor demand-driven oil-price shocks). We therefore follow Fry and Pagan (2011) and report a single model whose impulse responses are as close to the median values of the impulse vector as possible (this is called the median target). It is important to recognize that the distribution here is across di¤erent models and it has nothing to do with sampling uncertainty. To demonstrate how the cross-sectional dimension of the GVAR model can help with reducing the number of admissible models, we perform a series of exercises and summarize the results in Table 6 . We start with 5; 000 random draws of the rotation matrix and only impose the dynamic sign restrictions on the price/quantity of oil as well as on the U.S. output. Out of these replications, we achieve 466 and 3; 663 successful draws related to supply and demand shocks, respectively. Imposing the inequality constraints on impact oil price elasticities in addition to above sign restrictions further reduces the number of admissible models to 115 and 2; 443 for supply and demand shocks, respectively. This strategy is, therefore, particularly successful in eliminating all structural models that imply large price responses to oil supply shocks but leaves a wide spread of responses to demand shocks. Table  6 shows that when we impose cross-country restrictions (arising from the global dimension of the GVAR model) in addition to dynamic sign restrictions (third row) and bounds on impact price elasticities of oil supply and oil demand (last row), we can further reduce the number of admissible models for both of these shocks, especially for demand ones (from 3; 663 to 498). Overall, while the quantity restrictions help with the identi…cation of supply shocks, cross-country restrictions on real GDPs o¤er an intuitive way of imposing a large number of additional sign restrictions and better identi…es the demand shocks.
Oil-Supply Shocks
Figures 2-4 show the estimated median (blue solid) and the median target (black longdashed) impulse responses (for up to seven years) of key macroeconomic variables of oil exporters and major oil-importing countries to a supply-driven oil-price shock, together with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The consequences of a negative oil-supply shock are very di¤erent for oil-importing countries compared to energy-exporters. With regard to real output, following an oil-supply shock, Euro Area and the United States (two major energy-importing countries) experience a long-lived fall in economic activity, while for China and Japan the impact is even positive.
The results for the Euro Area and U.S. are as expected, but the positive output impact for China seems surprising at …rst. However, given China's heavy dependence on coal, as opposed to oil, for its energy consumption needs and the composition of its export basket, this result might not be that surprising after all. The United States (Euro Area) met 37% (40%) and 23% (12%) of its primary energy needs from oil and coal sources in 2010, respectively. In contrast, coal provided over 70% of China's primary energy needs in 2010, while oil amounted to less than 18% of the total. In fact, China accounts for just under half of global coal consumption, and its coal use has almost doubled during the recent oil boom (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) , and has more than doubled over the last decade (see British Petroleum's Statistical Review of World Energy). Considering the dominance of coal (rather than oil) in the Chinese economy, and given that most (if not all) of its coal consumption is met by domestic production, oil-supply disruptions (which may also increase global coal prices) will have relatively less of an impact on the Chinese economy. Moreover, given a near vertical oil-supply curve, oil exporters may experience a real GDP boost following an oil-price spike and cause a petrodollar recycling. Because China's export portfolio (mainly consisting of consumption and investment goods) …ts well the import demand of many oil-exporting countries, and given the fact that China's trade volume with major oil exporters is more than 14% of its total trade, we would expect higher import demand by oil exporters (due to income e¤ects) to positively a¤ect aggregate demand in China. Therefore, the negative e¤ect on domestic output of an oil-supply shock may not necessarily manifest itself in China. The positive impact of an oil supply shock on Japan's GDP can be explained through a similar channel, as Japan conducts more than 22% of its trade with major oil exporters.
The increase in real GDP following a decline in the rate of global oil production (an oilsupply shock) is also documented in Chapter 3 of International Monetary Fund (2011) WEO for the Emerging Asian countries (China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) and Japan. The prediction of this model is that a gradual (but moderate) increase in oil scarcity may not present a major constraint on emerging economies'growth (especially for Japan and China) in the medium to long term, although the wealth transfer from oil importers to exporters would increase capital ‡ows and widen current account imbalances. More speci…cally, following a fall in global oil production, simulations of International Monetary Fund (2011) WEO show that the real GDP of Japan and China would increase for a few quarters (under a number of alternative scenarios).
Turning to the major oil exporters in our sample, these countries can be split into two subsets. It appears that an oil-supply shock permanently increases output for those oil exporters that possess signi…cant amounts of proven oil reserves, and for which the reserveto-production ratio (given in the brackets in terms of years) is large: Canada (26), Ecuador (34), Iran (88), Libya (77), Nigeria (42), and Venezuela (>100), see Figure 3 . On the other hand for those countries with limited oil reserves and low oil reserve-to-production ratios, the impact is muted. For example, for Algeria (18) and Mexico (11), we see a temporary increase in real output, while for Norway (9), we have a permanent decrease in output.
For the GCC countries, the income e¤ect of an oil-supply shock is initially positive but turns negative in the long run. This is probably due to the indirect e¤ects of a supply-driven oil price shock (through changes in consumption patterns and technologies), which leads to a reallocation of labor and capital toward less-e¢ cient sectors. Interestingly, for Indonesia and the UK, the impact of an oil-supply shock on domestic output is negative. This is expected for the UK, as its oil exports started to decline rapidly in 1999 and it has been a net oil importer since 2006. Indonesian oil production, on the other hand, peaked in mid 1990s, and the share of oil exports in GDP has been declining steadily over the past three decades, so the impact should be similar to that of the UK, which is in fact what we observe.
Overall, while oil-importing countries typically face a long-lived (up to seven years) fall in economic activity in response to a supply-driven surge in oil prices, the impact is positive for energy-exporting countries that possess large proven oil/gas reserves and those for which the oil income to GDP ratio is expected to remain high over a prolonged period. This result contrasts with the standard literature on "Dutch disease" and the "resource curse", which primarily focuses on short-run implications of a temporary resource discovery. For major oil exporters, many of which started oil extraction and exports at the beginning of the 20th century, the reserve-to-extraction ratio indicates that they are capable of producing for many more decades even in the absence of new oil-…eld discoveries or major advances in oil exploration and extraction technologies. However, while it is clear that oil and gas reserves will be exhausted eventually, this is likely to take place over a relatively long period.
Our results are in line with those of Peersman and Van Robays (2012) , who show that a negative oil-supply shock results in a permanent fall in economic activity of net oil-importing countries and a positive impact (though at times not statistically signi…cant) on advanced economy oil-exporters (Australia, Canada, Norway, and UK). They are also supported by Esfahani et al. (2012a) , who develop an empirical growth model for major oil exporters and provide estimates for the positive long-run e¤ects of oil income on GDP growth rates for six OPEC member states (Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela).
We also …nd strong in ‡ationary pressures on the four energy-importing countries (China, Euro Area, Japan, and the United States), but the responses are negligible or even negative in net energy-exporting countries. On impact, in ‡ation increases in all of these oil-importing countries but the persistence of the responses changes with the magnitude of second-round e¤ects (arising from cost-push pressures or higher wage demands), the stance of monetary policy, and the ‡exibility of labor market in Europe compared with the United States or Asia. The di¤erent responses of oil-exporters are probably driven by movements of the real exchange rate in these countries. The real exchange rate tends to appreciate in most oil-exporting countries, limiting the pass-through e¤ect of higher international oil prices to domestic markets (and in ‡ation). We …nd that the real e¤ective exchange rate responses vary substantially across di¤erent countries. This could be attributed to the large number of factors that may a¤ect exchange rates, and the complexity of the mechanisms at play. Examples include the degree of pro(counter)cyclicality of monetary and …scal polices across oil-exporting countries, their exchange rate regimes, the degree of trade and …nancial openness, and the (non)existence of nonlinearities in the product and labor markets (e.g. real wage rigidities). Finally, the interest rate responses after an oil-supply shock are generally in accordance with the e¤ects on in ‡ation, i.e. only in oil-importing countries, where monetary policy is tightened to stabilize the second-round in ‡ationary pressures.
Oil-Demand Shocks
The rising demand for commodities by emerging markets-mainly by China and India, but also the Middle East and Latin America-is a frequently-cited factor in explaining the recent rise in oil-prices and its eventual impact on the global real economic activity, see for instance Hamilton (2009) and Kilian (2009) , as well as Figure 5 . This subsection investigates whether the macroeconomic e¤ects of a demand-driven oil-price shock are substantially di¤erent from those of an oil-supply disturbance (examined in Figures 2-4) . To do so, we maintain the view that while the long-term upward trend in commodity prices is re ‡ective of growing demand, the short-term increases are often driven more by supply ‡uctuations. Figures 6-8 show the median (blue solid) and median target (black long-dashed) impulse responses of key variables of oil-importing/exporting countries to a demand-driven oil-price shock, together with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. Following an oil-demand shock, almost all countries in our sample experience long-run in ‡ationary pressures and an increase in real output. This …nding is not surprising given that the oil-price spike is assumed to be determined endogenously by a shift in worldwide economic activity. Output can rise because the country itself is in a boom, or because it indirectly gains from trade with the rest of the world. These results are echoed by Peersman and Van Robays (2012) who show that a demand-driven oil-price shock results in a temporary increase of real GDP for their set of OECD countries. Furthermore, in all major oil-importing countries, interest rates increase while equity prices fall.
Speci…cally, a positive demand-driven oil price shock leads to an increase in GDP of systemically-important countries (China, Euro Area, Japan, and the United States) with this e¤ect being long-lived for all four countries. This …nding suggests that the primary e¤ect of higher external demand in these economies dominates the contractionary e¤ect of rising oil prices even in the longer-term. Such responses depend on the reaction of export, investment, and consumption demand in di¤erent countries to oil price increases, and the degree of pass-through of international commodity prices to domestic markets. They also depend on how quick and long-lasting the rise in export volumes are and whether they are accompanied by a real devaluation (where export prices rise by less than import prices, and hence the country's terms of trade improves). If oil price rises are completely passed-though to consumers, the corresponding loss in domestic purchasing powers would reduce private consumption and eventually real GDP. For instance, Chinese exporters do not completely pass-through the higher oil prices to their export products; something which enhances their competitiveness and leads to a higher demand for their products. 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we applied the sign restrictions approach to a Global VAR model including major oil exporters, estimated for 38 countries/regions over the period 1979Q2 to 2011Q2, to identify the di¤erential e¤ects of supply-driven versus demand-driven oil-price shocks. To narrow the set of admissible structural models, we also imposed bounds on impact price elasticities of oil supply and demand (to rule out those models that imply economically implausible responses), and utilized the global dimension of the GVAR model (which provides a large number of cross-country sign restrictions). These two approaches were shown to be helpful in calculating impulse responses that are qualitatively/quantitatively similar.
Consistent with the literature, but at a more disaggregated country level and for a wider range of macroeconomic aggregates, our results indicate that the underlying source of the oil-price shock is crucial in determining its macroeconomic consequence for oil-importing countries as well as major commodity exporters. In particular, the di¤erentiation between a net energy importer and a net oil exporter is only important when studying the macroeconomic e¤ects of a supply-driven oil-price shock. While oil importers typically experience a long-lived fall in economic activity in response to a supply-driven surge in oil prices, the impact is positive for energy-exporting countries that possess large proven oil/gas reserves. Cross-country di¤erences are absent though when it comes to the demand side of the global crude oil market. In response to an oil-demand disturbance, almost all countries in our sample experience an increase in real output and face in ‡ationary pressures.
A Data Appendix

A.1 Real GDP
We use the International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS) and World Economic Outlook (WEO) databases to compile the real GDP data. The 18 countries that we add to the GVAR dataset of Smith and Galesi (2010) are divided into two groups. First, those for which quarterly data are available. Second, those for which annual data are available.
For the …rst group (Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia), we use the IFS 99BVPZF series (GDP VOL) when available-quarterly data on GDP are reported since 1991Q1, 2002Q1, 1988Q1, 1992Q1, 1990Q1, and 2000Q1 for Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, respectively. We seasonally adjust these quarterly observations using the U.S. Census Bureau's X-12 ARIMA seasonal adjustment program.
14 Quarterly series are then interpolated (backwards) linearly from the annual series-either from the IFS or WEO-using the same method as that applied by . For the second group (Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Syria, Venezuela, and UAE), either the annual seasonally unadjusted IFS series (BVPZF and B..ZF) or the WEO real GDP series are interpolated to obtain the quarterly values. These series are then treated as the quarterly seasonally unadjusted data.
A.2 Consumer price index
We obtain seasonally adjusted quarterly observations on the consumer price index (CPI) for all added countries from the International Monetary Fund's INS database. Quarterly data on CPI are available since 1991Q1, 1980Q1, 2003Q2, and 1980Q1 for Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates, respectively. Annual WEO CPI series are interpolated linearly (backwards) to obtain quarterly observations for the missing values for these four countries.
A.3 Exchange rates
The IFS AE.ZF series are collected for all added 18 countries from the IMF IFS database.
A.4 Short term interest rates
The IMF IFS database is the main source of data for short-term interest rates. The IFS discount rate (60...ZF series) is used for Algeria, Ecuador, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Venezuela. The IFS deposit rate (60L..ZF series) is used for Bahrain, Egypt, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, and Syria. The IFS three-month interbank deposit rate or the money market rate (60B..ZF series) is used for Kuwait and Tunisia.
A.5 PPP-GDP weights
The main source for the country-speci…c GDP weights is the World Development Indicator database of the World Bank.
A.6 Trade matrices
To construct the trade matrices, we use the direction of trade statistics from the International Monetary Fund's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database. For all the countries considered we downloaded the matrix of exports and imports (c.i.f.) with annual frequency. The 38 38 trade-weight matrix is provided in Table 7 . 
B Country-Speci…c Estimates and Tests
Initial estimations and tests of the individual VARX*(s i ; s i ) models are conducted under the assumption that the country-speci…c foreign and global variables are weakly exogenous and integrated of order one, I (1), and that the parameters of the models are stable over time. As both assumptions are needed for the construction and the implementation of the GVAR model, we will test and provide evidence for these assumptions in Sections B.3 and B.4.
B.1 Unit Root Test
For the interpretation of the long-run relations, and also to ensure that we do not work with a mixture of I(1) and I(2) variables, we need to consider the unit root properties of the core variables in our country-speci…c models, see Table 4 . If the domestic, x it , foreign, x it , and global, d t , variables included in the country-speci…c models are indeed integrated of order one, I (1), we are not only able to distinguish between short-and long-run relations, but also to interpret the long-run relations as cointegrating. Therefore, we perform Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests on the level and …rst di¤erences of all the variables. However, as the power of unit root tests are often low, we also utilize the weighted symmetric ADF test (ADF-WS) of Park and Fuller (1995) , as it has been shown to have better power properties than the ADF test. This analysis results in over 3200 unit root tests, which overall, as a …rst-order approximation, support the treatment of the variables in our model as being I(1). For brevity, these test results are not reported here but are available upon request.
B.2 Lag Order Selection, Cointegrating Relations, and Persistence Pro…les
We use quarterly observations over the period 1979Q2-2011Q2, across the di¤erent speci…ca-tions in Table 4 , to estimate the 38 country/region-speci…c VARX*(s i ; s i ) models. However, prior to estimation we need to determine the lag orders of the domestic and foreign variables, s i and s i . For this purpose, we use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) applied to the underlying unrestricted VARX* models. Given the constraints imposed by data limitations, we set the maximum lag orders to s max = 2 and s max = 1. The selected VARX* orders are reported in Table 8 , from which we can see that for most countries a VARX*(2; 1) speci…ca-tion seems satisfactory, except for seven countries (Australia, Egypt, Iran, Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore, and the United Kingdom) for which s = s = 1 is selected by AIC.
Having established the order of the 38 VARX* models, we proceed to determine the number of long-run relations. Cointegration tests with the null hypothesis of no cointegration, one cointegrating relation, and so on are carried out using Johansen's maximal eigenvalue and trace statistics as developed in Pesaran et al. (2000) for models with weakly exogenous I (1) regressors, unrestricted intercepts and restricted trend coe¢ cients. We choose the number of cointegrating relations (r i ) based on the trace test statistics, given that it has better small sample properties than the maximal eigenvalue test, initially using the 95% critical values from MacKinnon (1991). 15 We then consider the e¤ects of system-wide shocks on the exactly identi…ed cointegrating vectors using persistence pro…les developed by Lee and Pesaran (1993) and Pesaran and Shin (1996) . On impact the persistence pro…les (PPs) are normalized to take the value of unity, but the rate at which they tend to zero provides information on the speed with which equilibrium correction takes place in response to shocks. The PPs could initially over-shoot, thus exceeding unity, but must eventually tend to zero if the vector under consideration is indeed cointegrated. In our preliminary analysis of the PPs we noticed that the speed of convergence was very slow for some countries, and for a few, the system-wide shocks never really died out. In particular, the speed of adjustment was very slow for the following 18 countries (with r i based on critical values from MacKinnon (1991) in brackets): Australia (4), Canada (4), China (2), Euro Area (2), Indonesia (3), Iran (2), Japan (3), Korea (4), Malaysia (2), Peru (3), Philippines (2), South Africa (2), Singapore (3), Switzerland (3), Thailand (3), Tunisia (2), the United Kingdom (2), and the United States (3).
Moreover, we noticed that a couple of eigenvalues of the GVAR model were larger than unity; rendering the global model unstable. To deal with this issue, and the possible overestimation of the number of cointegrating relations (using asymptotic critical values), we estimated a cointegrating VARX* model using the lag orders in Table 8 for each of the 18 countries separately. We then used the trace test statistics together with the 95% simulated critical values (computed by stochastic simulations using 127 observations from 1979Q4 to 2011Q2 and 1000 replications), to determine the number of cointegrating vectors. 16 We then re-estimated the global model reducing the number of cointegrating relations (for the 18 countries only) one by one, and re-examined the PPs after each estimation to ensure stability of the model. The …nal selection of the number of cointegrating relations are reported in Table 8 . For 12 of the 18 countries we selected r i based on the trace statistic and the simulated critical values. For four countries (China, Peru, Philippines, and the UK) the asymptotic and simulated critical values were the same so we reduced r i until the PPs for each country were well behaved; this was also done for Canada and Korea. The persistence pro…les for the set of 16 focus countries, the four largest oil importers and 12 oil exporters in our model (see Table 1 ), together with their 95% bootstrapped error bands are provided in Figure 9 . The pro…les overshoot for only 5 out of the 25 cointegrating vectors before quickly tending to zero. The speed of convergence is very fast, the half-life of the shocks are generally less than 3 quarters, and equilibrium is established before 6 years in all cases except for Libya. Amongst the 16 countries, Iran shows the fastest rate of convergence (around 3 years), 17 and Libya the slowest rate of convergence (8-9 years).
The 95% error bands are quite tight and initially widen somewhat before narrowing to zero. The speed of convergence, although relatively fast, is in line with that observed for major oil exporters in Esfahani et al. (2012a) . cannot be considered as weakly exogenous. This assumption is also rejected for the price of oil in the Canadian model, and oil production in the Euro Area and Iranian models. However, considering the signi…cance level assumed here, even if the weak exogeneity assumption is always valid, we would expect up to 14 rejections, 5% of the 263 tests. Therefore, overall, the available evidence in Table 9 supports our treatment of the foreign and global variables in the individual VARX* models as weakly exogenous.
B.4 Testing for Structural Breaks
Although the possibility of structural breaks is a fundamental problem in macroeconomic modelling in general, this is more likely to be a concern for a particular set of countries in our sample (i.e., emerging economies and non-OECD oil exporters) which have experienced both social and political changes since 1979. However, given that the individual VARX* models are speci…ed conditional on the foreign variables in x it , they are more robust to the possibility of structural breaks in comparison to reduced-form VARs, as the GVAR setup can readily accommodate co-breaking. See for a detailed discussion. of Ploberger and Krämer (1992) . We also test for parameter constancy over time against non-stationary alternatives as proposed by Nyblom (1989) (N Y ), and consider sequential Wald statistics for a single break at an unknown change point. More speci…cally, the mean Wald statistic of Hansen (1992) (M W ), the Wald form of the Quandt (1960) likelihood ratio statistic (QLR), and the Andrews and Ploberger (1994) Wald statistics based on the exponential average (AP W ). Finally, we also examine the heteroscedasticity-robust versions of N Y , M W , QLR, and AP W: Table 10 presents the number of rejections of the null hypothesis of parameter constancy per variable across the country-speci…c models at the 5% signi…cance level. For brevity, test statistics and bootstrapped critical values are not reported here but are available on request. Overall, it seems that most regression coe¢ cients are stable, however, the results vary considerably across di¤erent tests. In the case of the two P K tests, the null hypothesis is rejected between 3:4 7:8% of the time. For the N Y , M W , QLR; and AP W tests on the other hand, we note that the rejection rate is much larger, between 17:9 52:5%. The QLR and AP W rejection rates, for the joint null hypothesis of coe¢ cient and error variance stability, are particularly high with 94 and 89 cases respectively out of 179 being rejected. However, looking at the robust version of these tests, we note that the rejection rate falls considerably to between 10.1% and 18.4%. Therefore, although we …nd some evidence for structural instability, it seems that possible changes in error variances rather than parameter coe¢ cients is the main reason for this. We deal with this issue by using bootstrapped means and con…dence bounds when undertaking the impulse response analysis.
